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Abstract
Von Neumann (1928) not only introduced a fairly general version of
the extensive form game concept. He also hypothesized that only the
normal form was relevant to rational play. Yet even in Battle of the
Sexes, this hypothesis seems contradicted by players’ actual behaviour
in experiments. Here a refined Nash equilibrium is proposed for games
where one player moves first, and the only other player moves second
without knowing the first move. The refinement relies on a tacit un-
derstanding of the only credible and straightforward perfect Bayesian
equilibrium in a corresponding game allowing a predictable direct form
of cheap talk.
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1 Motivation and Introduction
1.1 Von Neumann’s Standard Paradigm
Following Zermelo’s (1912) pioneering analysis of chess and similar games,
von Neumann (1928) devised a standard paradigm according to which multi-
person decision problems in modern economic analysis and other social sci-
ence are nearly always modelled as non-cooperative games in strategic form.
This paradigm relies on two key assumptions, of which the first can be stated
as follows:
Assumption 1. A multi-person decision problem is fully described by a
game in extensive form, whose structure is commonly known to all players
in the game.
Von Neumann’s (1928) own extensive form description was later incor-
porated in The Theory of Games and Economic Behavior. Kuhn (1953)
pointed out the implicit assumption that the order of different players’ in-
formation sets was commonly known to all players at all stages of the game,
and extended the von Neumann description to relax this assumption. Much
more generally, we can now envisage an extensive form game as a stochastic
process subject to the control of different players, with each player’s infor-
mation at each time described by a filtration. One key assumption, however,
is that this stochastic process fits within Kolmogorov’s (1933) framework,
where everything random can be fitted within one overall probability space.
As I have argued in Hammond (2007), this fails to allow for the possibility
of having events that no player can foresee, and which may indeed even be
impossible for any ideal observer to foresee.
1.2 Normal Form Invariance
The second assumption, which seems to have originated in von Neumann
(1928), can be stated as follows:
Assumption 2. It loses no generality to reduce the game in extensive form
to the corresponding game in strategic or normal form, where each player
makes a single strategic plan that covers all eventualities in the extensive
form.
It is perhaps worth going back all the way to von Neumann’s original
article, as adapted in von Neumann and Morgenstern (1943), in order to
see how he justified normalizing the extensive form. First, normal form
strategies are described on p. 79:
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“Imagine now that each player . . . , instead of making each decision
as the necessity for it arises, makes up his mind in advance for all
possible contingencies; i.e., that the player . . . begins to play with a
complete plan: a plan which specifies what choices he will make in
every possible situation, for every possible actual information which
he may possess at that moment in conformity with the pattern of
information which the rules of the game provide for him for that case.
We call such a plan a strategy.”
Then pages 79–84 proceed to simplify the description of an extensive
form game, to arrive at the normal form of the game in which each player
makes just one move, and all moves are chosen simultaneously. In fact
(p. 84):
“Each player must make his choice [of strategy] in absolute igno-
rance of the choices of the others. After all choices have been made,
they are submitted to an umpire who determines . . . the outcome of
the play for [each] player.
Observe that in this scheme no space is left for any kind of further
‘strategy.’ Each player has one move, and one move only; and he must
make it in absolute ignorance of everything else.”
Normalizing an extensive form game in this way is an extremely powerful
device. And if the players of a game really do simultaneously submit their
choices of a strategy to an umpire, who then sees that the players never
deviate from their announced choices, then von Neumann and Morgenstern’s
claim on p. 85 seems entirely justified:
“ . . . we obtained an all-inclusive formal characterization of the
general game of n persons . . . . We followed up by developing an exact
concept of strategy which permitted us to replace the rather compli-
cated general scheme of a game by a much more simple special one,
which was nevertheless shown to be fully equivalent to the former . . . .
In the discussion which follows it will sometimes be more convenient
to use one form, sometimes the other. It is therefore desirable to give
them specific technical names. We will accordingly call them the ex-
tensive and the normalized form of the game, respectively.
Since these two forms are strictly equivalent, it is entirely within
our province to use in each particular case whichever is technically more
convenient at that moment. We propose, indeed, to make full use of
this possibility, and must therefore re-emphasize that this does not in
the least affect the absolute general validity of all our considerations.”
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It is this simplification that gives such power to familiar “normal form”
concepts like Nash equilibrium, as well as to less familiar ones like trembling-
hand perfect equilibrium (Selten, 1975), proper equilibrium (Myerson, 1978),
correlated equilibrium (Aumann, 1987), rationalizable strategies (Bernheim,
1984; Pearce, 1984). Also, Mailath, Samuelson, and Swinkels (1993) show
how even ostensibly extensive form ideas such as Selten’s (1965) concept
of subgame perfection, or Kreps and Wilson’s (1982) concept of sequential
equilibrium, have their (reduced) normal form counterparts.
Game theorists do relax normal form invariance somewhat by using
extensive form solution concepts. For example, requiring players to re-
spond credibly when other players deviate from expected behaviour was the
original motivation for subgame perfection. See also Amershi, Sadanand
and Sadanand (1985, 1989a, b, 1992), Hammond (1993), Sadanand and
Sadanand (1995), Battigalli (1997), Battigalli and Siniscalchi (1999, 2002),
and Asheim and Dufwenberg (2003), among other works that cast doubt on
the normal form invariance hypothesis.
1.3 Outline of Paper
The purpose of this paper is to present a theoretical argument supporting
the view that normal form invariance may be unduly restrictive. To do so,
Section 2 considers a simple “Battle of the Sexes” game, where experimental
evidence suggests that the first move does confer an advantage. It sets out
the claim that this may be due to what would happen in the unique credible
equilibrium of an associated game where cheap talk is possible after the first
move, but before the second.
Section 3 begins to analyse a general two-stage game where one player
moves first, and the only other player moves second, but without knowing
the first player’s move. It then allows simultaneous cheap talk by both
players at an intermediate stage, between their two moves.
Because we are looking for an equilibrium that the players can infer, we
require player 1’s cheap talk to be “predictable” in the sense that it results
from a pure strategy which is independent of her (hidden) action. Hence we
consider a game where player 1 combines a mixed act with a pure message
strategy. Afterwards player 2 first sends a message without knowing what
1 has done, then forms his conditional beliefs given 1’s message and chooses
an optimal mixed act accordingly.
Not surprisingly, any perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE) in the game
with predictable cheap talk must induce a Nash equilibrium in the corre-
sponding game without cheap talk. On the other hand, any Nash equilib-
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rium without cheap talk can be extended into a PBE by making the second
player “inattentive” to all cheap talk when forming his beliefs and choosing
his strategy. Thus, cheap talk alone fails to refine the set of PBEs.
In order to facilitate such a refinement, Section 4 invokes a particular
version of the revelation principle in the form due to Myerson (1982), as
amended by Kumar (1985). First, this will allow player 2’s message to be
ignored, since anything he says could affect only his own beliefs and actions.
Second, the revelation principle will allow general predictable cheap talk by
player 1 to be replaced by “direct” cheap talk in the form of two sugges-
tions for player 2, at his only ensuing information set: (i) the conditional
probabilities that should be attached to player 1’s earlier moves; (ii) player
2’s choice of mixed act. Moreover, as argued in Section 4, we can limit at-
tention to “straightforward” PBEs, where player 2 accepts both player 1’s
suggestions.
Section 5 finally introduces a credibility refinement. This requires a
straightforward PBE to survive even when the player 2 is “Nash attentive”
— i.e., when he accepts any suggestion by player 1 for choosing a Nash
equilibrium of the game without cheap talk. The resulting “credible” equi-
librium with cheap talk leads to an optimal Nash equilibrium for player 1 in
the original game without cheap talk. When this optimal Nash equilibrium
is unique, “sophistication” allows this cheap talk to remain implicit, so un-
necessary. While these results may be hardly surprising, they do show how
tacit communication can explain first-mover advantage in games like Battle
of the Sexes.
Section 6 considers “virtual observability”. This occurs when, as in
Battle of the Sexes, sophistication effectively converts the game into one of
perfect information, with the second player knowing the first move. Three
examples show that virtual observability is rather special.
The concluding Section 7 discusses possible extensions and suggestions
for future work that relaxes normal form invariance in other ways.
Except where it is standard, most notation will be explained wherever
it is first used. Given any finite set F , however, let ∆(F ) denote the set
of probability distributions over F . Also, if F ′ is a proper subset of F , let
∆(F ′) ⊂ ∆(F ) denote those distributions that attach probability one to F ′.
Finally, if X and Y are arbitrary sets, let XY :=
∏
y∈Y Xy denote the set of
all mappings y 7→ xy from Y to X.
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2 Battle of the Sexes
2.1 Two Different Extensive Forms
The two games in Figs. 1 and 2 are different extensive form versions of the
familiar “Battle of the Sexes” game, whose normal form is given in Fig. 3. As
is well known, there are two Nash equilibria in pure strategies, namely (B, b)
and (S, s). There is also one mixed strategy Nash equilibrium where player
1 chooses B with probability 23 , and player 2 chooses b with probability
1
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Figure 3: Battle of the Sexes in Normal Form
Nevertheless, experiments strongly suggest that the player who moves
first enjoys an advantage, in so far as (B, b) is played more often than (S, s)
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in Fig. 1, but less often in Fig. 2.1 These results have usually been ascribed
to “positional order” or “presentation” effects that are seen as psychological
or behavioral rather than fully rational responses to a change in the extensive
form of the game.
2.2 Direct Cheap Talk in Battle of the Sexes
Consider the extensive form of Fig. 1, where player 1 moves first, and this
is common knowledge. Suppose that, during an intermediate stage that
succeeds player 1’s move but precedes player 2’s, the two players are allowed
to communicate and indulge in unrestricted and mutually comprehensible
“cheap talk”.
As argued in Section 4, however, an extended version of the revelation
principle implies that, in perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE) only player
1’s cheap talk is relevant; it is already too late for player 2 to influence any
action choice except his own. Moreover, we need only consider direct cheap
talk where player 1’s message m is a pair suggesting conditional probabilities
ρ(·) ∈ ∆({B,S}) and a mixed strategy σ(·) ∈ ∆({b, s}) for player 2 at his
only information set. Finally, the same principle allows us to limit attention
to a “straightforward” PBE, where player 2 accepts 1’s suggestions.
Now, any straightforward PBE would seem to involve just one of three
possible direct messages that player 1 might send, corresponding to the three
different Nash equilibria of the normal form:
1. corresponding to the equilibrium (B, b), a message with ρ(B) = σ(b) =
1 that yields the two players’ expected payoffs of (2, 1);
2. corresponding to the equilibrium (S, s), a message with ρ(S) = σ(s) =
1 that yields the two players’ expected payoffs of (1, 2);
3. corresponding to the mixed strategy equilibrium, a message with
ρ(B) = σ(s) = 23 and ρ(S) = σ(b) =
1
3
1A “preliminary” experiment along these lines is described by Amershi, Sadanand,
and Sadanand (1989b). Kreps (1990, p. 100) writes of “casual experiences playing this
game with students”. Later formal experiments yielding similar results were reported in
Cooper et al. (1989, 1993). See also Schotter, Weigelt and Wilson (1994), Gu¨th, Huck
and Rapoport (1998), Muller and Sadanand (2003), Weber, Camerer and Knez (2004).
The paper by Gu¨th et al. even includes an experiment in which a form of cheap talk
is explicitly allowed. The experimental design, however, includes the wording “B learns
about A’s decision” in the instructions. This may bias the results by offering the subjects
too little encouragement to recognize the possibility of sending or receiving a deceptive
message.
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which yields the two players’ expected payoffs of (23 ,
2
3).
2.3 One Credible Equilibrium with Cheap Talk
In this Battle of the Sexes game with cheap talk, suppose all three “straight-
forward” messages could be regarded as credible. Then player 1 would ex-
pect player 2 to respond appropriately to whichever straightforward message
she sends. So she would definitely choose the first of the three. But then, if
player 2 hears any direct message except “I have played B and recommend
that you play b”, he should wonder whether player 1 has really not played B,
or whether player 1 has somehow misspoken after playing B. Thus, player
2’s best response to any other direct message actually becomes unclear. In
the case of Battle of the Sexes, however, all that matters is that player 2
does choose b when player 1 suggests he should. This leaves us with just
one possible outcome of any credible perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE).
Finally, if predictable direct cheap talk would produce a unique credible
equilibrium message, we assume that both players are sufficiently “sophisti-
cated” to reason what it will be. But this removes any need for cheap talk.
Player 2 can work out the unique equilibrium message that he would receive
in any credible PBE of the game with predictable direct cheap talk, and
player 1 should know this also. By tacitly inferring what would happen if
cheap talk were actually permitted, they reach the same unique outcome as
in any credible PBE with predictable cheap talk.
3 General Two-Stage Games
3.1 The Basic Extensive Game
Instead of the specific Battle of the Sexes game discussed in Section 2,
consider a general two-stage game Γ0 with two players 1 and 2, for whom
all the following facts are common knowledge. Player 1 begins the game
by choosing an action a1 from the finite set A1. Then player 2 at his only
information set, without seeing a1, finishes the game by choosing an action
a2 from the finite set A2. Each player i’s payoff is denoted by ui(a1, a2) (for
i = 1, 2). Allowing for mixed strategies αi ∈ ∆(Ai), the normal form of Γ0
can be written as
G0 = 〈{1, 2},∆(A1),∆(A2), v1, v2〉 (1)
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with (expected) payoffs vi : ∆(A1)×∆(A2)→ R for i = 1, 2 given by
vi(α1, α2) :=
∑
a1∈A1
∑
a2∈A2
α1(a1)α2(a2)ui(a1, a2). (2)
Next, given their respective beliefs pi1 ∈ ∆(A2) and pi2 ∈ ∆(A1), define the
two players’ mixed strategy best response sets
B1(pi1) := arg max
α1∈∆(A1)
v1(α1, pi1) (3)
and B2(pi2) := arg max
α2∈∆(A2)
v2(pi2, α2). (4)
Finally, we denote the set of mixed strategy Nash equilibra of G0 by
E0 := { (α1, α2) ∈ ∆(A1)×∆(A2) | α1 ∈ B1(α2), α2 ∈ B2(α1) }. (5)
These are also the Nash (and perfect Bayesian) equilibra of Γ0.
3.2 Predictable Cheap Talk
Cheap talk is introduced by allowing the two players to choose simultaneous
message strategies mi ∈ Mi (for i = 1, 2) after player 1 has chosen a1, but
before player 2 chooses a2. Often it will be convenient to let m ∈ M :=
M1 ×M2 denote the typical message pair (m1,m2). Of course, the main
claim of this paper is precisely that it really is restrictive to reduce complex
interactions to single strategy choices by each player.2 Nevertheless, such
restrictions seem not to detract from the force of the argument.
Also, we will look eventually for a predictable unique equilibrium of the
game with cheap talk. Note, however, that no mixed message strategies
could work this way; player 2 could not predict what messages result from
such randomization. Indeed, player 1 cannot even make her message depend
on the action that results from a mixed action strategy. So we consider only
“predictable” cheap talk that results in one fixed message strategy for each
player, independent of player 1’s earlier action.
2Moreover, this rules out the kind of “long” cheap talk considered by Aumann and Hart
(2003). Their model, however, involves messages that are sent by choosing one among
only a finite set of “keystrokes”. Also, the only example they provide of an equilibrium
involving long cheap talk is presented in their Section 2.8. In a particular signalling game,
it amounts to finding a mixed message strategy with infinite support. The formulation
used here would allow any such message to be sent in only one stage.
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3.3 An Extensive Form Game
An obvious two-person extensive game of perfect recall with predictable
cheap talk proceeds in three successive stages as follows:
First action stage: Player 1 has one initial information set where she
chooses a mixed action strategy α1 ∈ ∆(A1).
Intermediate message stage: Both players simultaneously choose pre-
dictable messages m1 ∈ M1 and m2 ∈ M2. Though player 1 knows
α1 and even a1, predictability rules out using this information. Hence
both players communicate as though they have a single information
set at this stage.
Second action stage: Player 2 has an information set H2(m) for each pos-
sible message pair m ∈ M . This enables him to choose a function
α2(·|·) ∈ [∆(A2)]M mapping each m ∈ M to a mixed action strategy
α2(·|m) ∈ ∆(A2).
Let Γ denote this extensive game. Its normal form can be written as
G = 〈{1, 2}, S1, S2, w1, w2〉 (6)
where the two players’ permitted (mixed) strategy sets have typical members
denoted by
(α1,m1) ∈ S1 := ∆(A1)×M1 (7)
and (m2, α2(·|·)) ∈ S2 := M2 × [∆(A2)]M . (8)
Also, definition (2) allows the two players’ expected final payoffs wi : S1 ×
S2 → R to be written as
wi(α1,m1,m2, α2(·|·, ·)) := vi(α1, α2(·|m1,m2)). (9)
3.4 Characterizing Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium
In a general extensive form game, a perfect Bayesian equilibria (PBE) is a
strategy–belief profile which, for each player i and for each information set H
where i has the move, combines: (i) a behavioural strategy specifying what
(mixed) move i makes at H; (ii) a belief system specifying what subjective
probabilities player i attaches to the different nodes of H. Moreover, this
combination must satisfy the two requirements:
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Consistent beliefs: Player i’s beliefs at H are derived by Bayesian up-
dating, provided the conditional probabilities are well defined given
equilibrium moves at previous information sets;
Sequential rationality: Player i’s move at H should maximize i’s con-
ditional expected payoff given the players’ behavior strategies at all
other information sets, and given player i’s beliefs at H.
For the game Γ, accordingly, any strategy–belief profile involves player
2’s conditional beliefs at each information set H2(m), after observing the
message pair m = (m1,m2) ∈ M . We regard any such belief system as a
mapping m 7→ pi(·|m) from M to ∆(A1), denoted by
pi(·|·) ∈ [∆(A1)]M . (10)
We now give conditions for a particular strategy–belief profile
(α∗1,m
∗, α∗2(·|·), pi∗(·|·)) ∈ ∆(A1)×M × [∆(A2)]M × [∆(A1)]M (11)
in Γ to be a PBE.
At each last information set H2(m) of Γ, following the observed message
pair m ∈M , player 2’s equilibrium belief system pi∗(·|·) determines his best
response set B2(pi∗(·|m)). Sequential rationality therefore requires player 2’s
behavior strategy at H2(m) to satisfy
α∗2(·|m) ∈ B2(pi∗(·|m)) for each m ∈M. (12)
Earlier, anticipating player 2’s equilibrium message m∗2 and sequentially
rational response to each pair (m1,m∗2), player 1 chooses the pair
(α∗1,m
∗
1) ∈ arg max
(α1,m1)∈∆(A1)×M1
v1(α1, α∗2(·|m1,m∗2)). (13)
This implies in particular that in the first action stage 1, anticipating both
the equilibrium message pair m∗ ∈ M and player 2’s induced response
α∗2(·|m∗), player 1 chooses a mixed action strategy satisfying
α∗1 ∈ B1(α∗2(·|m∗)). (14)
During the intermediate message stage, player 2 anticipates player 1’s
choice of (α∗1,m∗1) and his own sequentially rational response to each pair
m ∈M . Hence player 2’s equilibrium message m∗2 satisfies
m∗2 ∈ arg max
m2∈M2
v2(α∗1, α
∗
2(·|m∗1,m2)). (15)
10
Finally, consistency of beliefs on the equilibrium path implies that
pi∗(·|m∗) = α∗1. (16)
Then (12) implies that player 2 chooses a mixed strategy satisfying
α∗2(·|m∗) ∈ B2(α∗1). (17)
3.5 Perfect Bayesian and Nash Equilibria
The following simple result establishes that, because any PBE of Γ induces
Nash equilibrium strategies along an equilibrium path, it induces Nash equi-
librium action strategies in the game G0 without cheap talk.
Lemma 1. Suppose the strategy–belief profile (α∗1,m∗, α∗2(·|·), pi∗(·|·)) is a
PBE in the game Γ with predictable cheap talk. Then the mixed action strat-
egy profile (α∗1, α∗2(·|m∗)) in ∆(A1) × ∆(A2) induced along the equilibrium
path must be a Nash equilibrium in the game Γ0 without cheap talk.
Proof. Given the equilibrium message pair m∗, conditions (14) and (17)
imply that the induced mixed strategies α∗1 and α∗2(·|m∗) are mutual best
responses. So the strategy pair belongs to the set E0 of Nash equilibria of
the game Γ0 without cheap talk, as defined in (5).
The next result shows that cheap talk alone excludes none of the Nash
equilibria in the game Γ0. In particular, all three Nash equilibria in the
Battle of the Sexes example of Section 2 can be extended to PBEs with
appropriate cheap talk.
Definition 1. In the game Γ with predictable cheap talk, player 2’s strategy–
belief system (α2(·|·), pi(·|·)) ∈ [∆(A2) × ∆(A1)]M is inattentive if both
α2(·|m) and pi(·|m) are constant, independent of m, for all message pairs
m ∈ M . A PBE (α∗1,m∗, α∗2(·|·), pi∗(·|·)) in Γ is inattentive if player 2’s
equilibrium strategy–belief system is inattentive.
Lemma 2. Let (α¯1, α¯2) ∈ E0 be any Nash equilibrium in the game Γ0
without cheap talk. Let M be any message space for player 1. Then the
corresponding game Γ with predictable cheap talk in M has an inattentive
PBE which induces (α¯1, α¯2) along the equilibrium path.
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Proof. Consider the strategy–belief profile in Γ where:
1. player 1 combines α∗1 = α¯1 with an arbitrary message m∗1 ∈M1;
2. player 2 sends an arbitrary message m∗2 ∈M2;
3. player 2’s strategy–belief system is inattentive, with
α∗2(·|m) = α¯2 and pi∗(·|m) = α¯1 for all m ∈M. (18)
It is easy to see that (α∗1,m∗, α∗2(·|·), pi∗(·|·)) must be a PBE.
4 An Extended Revelation Principle
4.1 Direct Cheap Talk
The revelation principle will involve a new game Γˆ which is like Γ except
that:
1. Player 2’s message space M2 becomes a singleton {m¯2}, so he can
only send a constant message m¯2. This makes 2’s message irrelevant,
of course, so we ignore it from now on.
2. Player 1’s general messages m1 ∈M1 are replaced by direct messages
mˆ = (ρ, σ) ∈ Mˆ := ∆(A1)×∆(A2). (19)
Here, following Kumar’s (1985) extension of the revelation principle,
the first component ρ ∈ ∆(A1) of each direct message that player 1 might
send can be interpreted as beliefs about player 1’s strategy that 1 suggests
to 2. Following Myerson (1982), the second component σ ∈ ∆(A2) can be
interpreted as the mixed strategy that 1 suggests to 2.3
The typical strategy–belief profile in the game Γˆ with direct cheap talk
will be denoted by
(αˆ1, mˆ, αˆ2(·|·), pˆi(·|·) ∈ ∆(A1)× Mˆ × [∆(A2)]Mˆ × [∆(A1)]Mˆ . (20)
3Following Forges (1986), many later writers describe direct messages as “canonical”.
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4.2 Equivalent Straightforward Equilibria
Definition 2. In the game Γˆ with direct cheap talk, the strategy–belief profile
(αˆ1, mˆ, αˆ2(·|·), pˆi(·|·) with mˆ = (ρ, σ) is straightforward if
pˆi(·|mˆ) = ρ = αˆ1 and αˆ2(·|mˆ) = σ. (21)
A strategy–belief profile that is straightforward and also a PBE is a straight-
forward PBE.
That is, a strategy–belief profile is straightforward if player 1 suggests
beliefs that match her mixed action and if player 2 accepts both suggestions
that make up player 1’s direct message.
The following result extends to our setting the versions of the revelation
principle due to Myerson (1982) and Kumar (1985).
Theorem 1. Let (α∗1,m∗, α∗2(·|·), pi∗(·|·)) be any PBE strategy–belief profile
in the game Γ with general predictable cheap talk. Then in the associated
game Γˆ with direct cheap talk there is an equivalent PBE
(αˆ∗1, mˆ
∗, αˆ∗2(·|·), pˆi∗(·|·)) (22)
that is inattentive, straightforward, and generates the same equilibrium ac-
tion strategy pair
(αˆ∗1, αˆ
∗
2(·|mˆ∗)) = (α∗1, α∗2(·|m∗)). (23)
Proof. By Lemma 1, the mixed action strategy pair (α∗1, α∗2(·|m∗)) generated
by the PBE of Γ must be a Nash equilibrium of the game Γ0 without cheap
talk. To construct the equivalent PBE strategy–belief profile (22), first
choose αˆ∗1 = α∗1. Next, define the equivalent direct message mˆ∗ ∈ Mˆ in the
game Γˆ as the Nash equilibrium pair (α∗1, α∗2(·|m∗)) itself. Finally, define
an inattentive strategy–belief system for player 2 by choosing pˆi∗(·|mˆ) := α∗1
and αˆ∗2(·|mˆ) := α∗2(·|m∗) for each direct message mˆ ∈ Mˆ = ∆(A1)×∆(A2).
Evidently the constructed strategy–belief profile (22) is both inattentive
and straightforward. As in Lemma 2, it is also a PBE of Γˆ.
The extended revelation principle is especially useful in allowing any
PBE in the game Γ with predictable cheap talk to be converted to an inat-
tentive straightforward PBE in the associated game Γˆ with direct cheap
talk. Nevertheless, Lemma 2 applies even in Γˆ. For this reason, an extra
consideration is needed to refine the set of Nash equilibria.
13
5 Credible Equilibria with Direct Cheap Talk
5.1 Nash Attentiveness
The following definition requires player 2 to accept player 1’s direct message
in Γˆ whenever it suggests a specific Nash equilibrium of the game Γ0 without
cheap talk.
Definition 3. In the game Γˆ with direct cheap talk, player 2’s strategy–
belief system (αˆ2(·|·), pˆi(·|·)) ∈ [∆(A2) × ∆(A1)]Mˆ is Nash attentive if it
satisfies (αˆ2(·|mˆ), pˆi(·|mˆ)) = mˆ whenever the direct message mˆ = (ρ, σ) ∈
Mˆ = ∆(A1)×∆(A2), viewed as a pair of mixed strategies, constitutes a Nash
equilibrium of the game Γ0 without cheap talk. A PBE strategy–belief profile
is Nash attentive if player 2’s strategy–belief system is Nash attentive.
5.2 First-Mover Advantage with Cheap Talk
We now show that the PBEs of Γˆ with Nash attentive beliefs generate Nash
equilibria in Γ0 that are optimal for the first mover.
Definition 4. In the game Γ0 without cheap talk, the Nash equilibrium
mixed strategy pair (α∗1, α∗2) ∈ ∆(A1) ×∆(A2) is optimal for player 1 if
v1(α∗1, α∗2) ≥ v1(α1, α2) for all (α1, α2) in the set E0 of Nash equilibria in Γ0.
The same pair is uniquely optimal for player 1 if v1(α∗1, α∗2) > v1(α1, α2)
for all alternative Nash equilibria (α1, α2) ∈ E0 \ {(α∗1, α∗2)}.
Theorem 2. Let (αˆ∗1, mˆ∗, αˆ∗2(·|·), pˆi∗(·|·)) be any straightforward Nash atten-
tive PBE strategy–belief profile in the game Γˆ with predictable direct cheap
talk. Then the action profile (α∗1, α∗2) := (αˆ∗1, αˆ∗2(·|mˆ∗)) induced on the equi-
librium path is an optimal Nash equilibrium for player 1 in the game Γ0
without cheap talk.
Proof. Applying equilibrium condition (13) to Γˆ instead of Γ gives
(αˆ∗1, mˆ
∗) ∈ arg max
(α1,mˆ)∈∆(A1)×Mˆ
v1(α1, αˆ∗2(·|mˆ). (24)
Let (α¯1, α¯2) ∈ E0 be any Nash equilibrium in Γ0. Because player 2’s strategy
αˆ∗2(·|mˆ) is Nash attentive in the game Γˆ, player 1’s expected payoff from
choosing (α1, mˆ) with α1 = α¯1 and mˆ = (α¯1, α¯2) will be
v1(α¯1, αˆ∗2(·|mˆ)) = v1(α¯1, α¯2). (25)
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Now (24) implies that v1(αˆ∗1, αˆ∗2(·|mˆ∗)) ≥ v1(α¯1, αˆ∗2(·|mˆ)), and so v1(α∗1, α∗2) ≥
v1(α¯1, α¯2) by (25). This holds for every (α¯1, α¯2) ∈ E0. But Lemma 1 im-
plies that (α∗1, α∗2) ∈ E0, so it must be an optimal Nash equilibrium for
player 1.
The next definition considers what happens when player 2 may not be
fully Nash attentive, but is nevertheless attentive at least to messages that
suggest following a Nash attentive straightforward PBE.
Definition 5. A straightforward PBE strategy–belief profile in the game
Gˆ with direct cheap talk is credible if it is identical to a Nash attentive
straightforward PBE along the equilibrium path.
Obviously, by Theorem 2, any such credible PBE must also induce an
optimal Nash equilibrium outcome for player 1.
5.3 First-Mover Advantage without Cheap Talk
Suppose the game Γˆ with predictable direct cheap talk has a unique credible
PBE. Then the two players can reasonably expect each other to infer what
this direct cheap talk would be, even in the game Γ0 without cheap talk.
The following definition singles out the corresponding Nash equilibrium of
this game.
Definition 6. A Nash equilibrium of the game Γ0 without cheap talk is
sophisticated if it is induced by a credible straightforward PBE of the cor-
responding game Γˆ with predictable direct cheap talk, and moreover this cred-
ible PBE is unique.
Theorem 3. Suppose (α∗1, α∗2) is a uniquely optimal Nash equilibrium for
player 1 in Γ0. Then (α∗1, α∗2) is the unique sophisticated equilibrium.
Proof. Theorem 2 implies that there is a unique credible PBE of Γˆ, and that
this equilibrium induces (α∗1, α∗2).
Figure 4 specifies an example of a normal form game G0 in which, if
player 1 moves first in the associated extensive form Γ0, there is no sophis-
ticated equilibrium. Not surprisingly, cheap talk plays a key role here in
enabling coordination on one of the two Nash equilibria that are equally
good for player 1. But if the two players’ payoffs after (L, `) were (1 + , δ)
instead, for any  > 0 and any δ > 0, then (L, `) would be the unique
sophisticated equilibrium.
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` r
L 1, 1 0, 0
R 0, 0 1, 1
Figure 4: A Game with No Sophisticated Equilibrium
6 The Special Case of Virtual Observability
6.1 Definition
Corresponding to our basic game Γ0 without cheap talk, there is an associ-
ated extensive form game
Γ1 := 〈{1, 2},∆(A1), [∆(A2)]A1 , v1, v2〉 (26)
of perfect information, where player 2 is informed of 1’s move and so can
make his mixed strategy α2 ∈ ∆(A2) a function of player 1’s action a1. Now
the Battle of Sexes example of Fig. 1 has a unique sophisticated equilibrium
where both players effectively act as though player 1’s move could indeed be
observed. It is a case where the same pure strategy profile (a1, a2) ∈ A1×A2
in the game G0 happens to be both the unique outcome of any credible
PBE in Γˆ and of any subgame perfect equilibrium in Γ1. Weber, Camerer
and Knez (2004) call this “virtual observability”. The next three examples
remind us that it is really a very special property.
6.2 Duopoly: Cournot versus Stackelberg
Consider a duopoly where firm 1 is able to choose its quantity before firm 2.
Also, suppose both firms know this and that firm 2 can observe 1’s out-
put. Then it is fairly obvious that any sophisticated equilibrium must be a
subgame perfect equilibrium where firm 1 acts as a Stackelberg leader and
firm 2 as a follower. If firm 1’s output remains hidden, however, the normal
form of the game corresponds to one in which the duopolists choose their
quantities simultaneously. Then a sophisticated equilibrium is Cournot.
For example, suppose each firm i ∈ {1, 2} has the profit function
Πi(qi, qj) = βiqi − γqiqj − 12q2i
which is quadratic in its own quantity qi and also depends on the other’s
quantity qj . Suppose too that each firm is risk neutral and so maximizes
expected profit. Finally, suppose that the three parameters β1, β2 and γ
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are positive and satisfy the restrictions β1 > γβ2, β2 > γβ1, and γ <
1/
√
2. Even if the first firm pursues a mixed strategy, the second firm’s
optimal choice satisfies q2 = β2 − γ E q1, where E denotes the mathematical
expectation. Thus, the first firm’s expected profit is
EΠ1 = (α1 − γq2)Eq1 + γ2(Eq1)2 − 12Eq21.
This is maximized by choosing the Stackelberg leader’s pure strategy qS1 :=
(β1−γβ2)/(1−2γ2), which exceeds the unique Cournot equilibrium quantity
qC1 := (β1 − γβ2)/(1 − γ2). It follows that virtual observability fails, even
though there is a unique Nash equilibrium and it uses pure strategies.
6.3 Mixed Strategies
Consider the simple and familiar example of matching pennies, whose nor-
mal form is shown in Figure 5. There is a unique Nash equilibrium, associ-
ated with a unique straightforward PBE strategy–belief profile in the cor-
responding game of predictable direct cheap talk. The only direct message
mˆ = (ρ, σ) ∈ ∆({H,T}) ×∆({h, t}) that is sent in this unique equilibrium
has ρ(H) = ρ(T ) = σ(h) = σ(t) = 12 . Obviously, the need for mixed action
strategies in Nash equilibrium implies that virtual observability cannot hold.
h t
H 1,−1 −1, 1
T −1, 1 1,−1
Figure 5: Matching Pennies
6.4 Multiple Nash Equilibria
h t e
H 4, 0 0, 4 0, 0
T 0, 4 4, 0 0, 0
E 0, 0 0, 0 1, 1
Figure 6: Extended Matching Pennies
The game in Fig. 6 is matching pennies played for a stake of $4 supplied by
a third party. The game is also extended by allowing each (steady handed)
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player to choose “edge” as well as heads or tails. If just one player chooses
edge, the stake is withdrawn, and neither wins anything. But if both choose
edge the third party pays each $1 for being imaginative.
In the corresponding extensive form game Γ1 with perfect information
where player 1 moves first, player 2 would choose: t in response to H; h in
response to T ; and e in response to E. So Γ1 has (E, e) as a unique subgame
perfect equilibrium. This is not induced by a credible straightforward PBE
of Gˆ, however, because a better Nash equilibrium of G0 for player 1 is
the familiar mixed strategy equilibrium with α1(H) = α1(T ) = α2(h) =
α2(t) = 12 , since player 1’s expected payoff is 2 rather than 1. Once again,
virtual observability fails, and in this case it does so even though the unique
subgame perfect equilibrium is a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies.
6.5 Implications of Virtual Unobservability
When virtual observability fails, the extensive game Γ0 is fundamentally dif-
ferent from Γ1 where player 2 is informed of player 1’s earlier move. Some-
times, as in Figs. 5 and 6, this is because player 1 gains by keeping her initial
move concealed. Sometimes, however, as in Section 6.2, player 1 could gain
from having her initial move revealed. In that example, the first duopolist
would earn more profit from being a Stackelberg leader. It would also like to
report having chosen the Stackelberg leader’s optimal quantity qS1 , expect-
ing the second firm to choose its best response qS2 := β2 − γ qS1 . However,
that report is not credible because, if it were believed, the first firm does
even better by choosing its best response q1 = β1 − γ qS2 6= qS1 . So requiring
the follower to be attentive only to the Nash equilibrium message qC1 in any
Nash attentive straightforward PBE imposes a binding constraint on the
leader’s strategy choice.
7 Concluding Remarks
7.1 Beyond Experimental Anomalies
Experimental economists have recognized that there is a first-mover advan-
tage in Battle of the Sexes and similar games. They typically ascribe this
advantage, however, to “positional” or “presentational” effects, suggesting
the need to look beyond orthodox rationality concepts in order to explain
their experimental results.
This paper, by contrast, introduces a “sophisticated” refinement of Nash
equilibrium that can explain first-mover advantage using only a minor varia-
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tion of standard rationality and equilibrium concepts. This refinement, like
the “manipulated Nash equilibrium” concept explored in Amershi, Sadanand
and Sadanand (1985, 1989a, b, 1992) and in Sadanand and Sadanand (1995),
depends on the extensive form of the game. So it violates von Neumann’s
hypothesis of normal form invariance. Unlike manipulated Nash equilib-
rium, however, the tacit communication that underlies forward induction
arguments is explicitly modelled through a corresponding game with cheap
talk. This cheap talk is required to be predictable so that it can remain
tacit.4
Nevertheless, the precise relationship between sophisticated and manip-
ulated Nash equilibrium deserves further exploration. The ideas presented
here should also be applied to a much broader class of games, starting with
the “recursive games” considered in Hammond (1982).
7.2 Beyond Orthodox Game Theory
Much of orthodox game theory is built on two assumptions of what one may
call the “ZNK paradigm” — due to Zermelo (1912), won Neumann (1928)
and Kolmogorov (1933). This paper has criticized normal form invariance,
the second of these. But the first, claiming that games can be modelled
with a single extensive form, is also questionable, as discussed in Hammond
(2007). So, of course, is a third key assumption, namely that all players are
fully rational, and so will always find the optimal action at each information
set.
Indeed, following Zermelo (1912), orthodox game theory predicts that
any two-person zero-sum game of perfect information such as Go should be
played perfectly, and so perfectly predictably. Yet we find the following in
a prominent novel by an author who won the Nobel Prize for Literature in
1968.
“ ‘This is what war must be like,’ said Iwamoto gravely.
He meant of course that in actual battle the unforeseeable occurs and
fates are sealed in an instant. Such were the implications of White
130. All the plans and studies of the players, all the predictions of us
amateurs and of the professionals as well had been sent flying.
As an amateur, I did not immediately see that White 130 assured the
defeat of the ‘invincible Master.’ ”
4A conjecture is that relaxing predictability in the game with cheap talk would allow
player 1 to achieve her optimal correlated equilibrium. Where this is better than her
optimal Nash equilibrium, cheap talk is essential as a correlation device. Without it,
player 2 cannot infer what correlated equilibrium strategy to choose.
19
Yasunari Kawabata (1954) The Master of Go, translated from the au-
thor’s own shortened version by Edward G. Seidensticker (New York:
Alfred A. Knopf, 1972); end of chapter 37.
Such considerations remind us how far the three standard assumptions
take us from reality. To conclude, it seems that the systematic study of
games and economic behaviour has barely progressed beyond a promising
but possibly misleading beginning.
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